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In what sense is the Prototokos a kosmos?  







To conclude a discursive exegesis of John 8:32,1 Origen asks in what way the, 
“Firstborn (Prototokos) of all creation is able to be a world.” The word translated 
as “world” in John’s gospel and in Origen’s text is κόσµος (kosmos). Origen then 
proceeds to explain in what sense he thinks the Prototokos is able to be a kosmos—
but the explanation itself seems to require explanation. What sense of the word 
kosmos does Origen mean? The problem is unresolved. In fact, the use of kosmos 
here is so cryptic that even in Lampe’s Lexicon the lexical entry for κόσµος 
contains a sub-definition that cites only the present passage from Origen as an 
example of this particular meaning of the word. Yet the meaning itself remains 
unclear. Origen is using the word in a new way, and in so doing makes a radical 
Christological claim. This article will present the problem as it stands, introduce 
prior attempts at interpreting the cryptic passage, and finally put forth an original 
interpretation. In addition to attempting a better understanding of this particular 
passage in Origen’s commentary on John, the question has implications for our 




Origen is quite clear that he does not mean that the first-born is a “world” in any 
kind of physical sense (οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης), and so we are encouraged to consider 
how the first-born might be a kosmos in another sense of that word. The meaning 
of kosmos that refers to the physical world is actually a relatively late one in the 
semantic development of the word. In classical Greek the word kosmos is related 
to the verb κοσµέω (kosmeō) which means “to set in order”. The original meaning 
                                                
1 And he said to them: You are from below, I am from above. You are of this world, I am not of 
this world. 
 of kosmos is thus “order” as in “measure”. Its literary heritage stretches all the way 
back to Homer.2 The word also comes to mean “ornament” or “decoration” (cf. 
Eng. “cosmetic”) especially of women.3 Another later meaning is “ruler” as in the 
one who orders or regulates the state.4 The meaning of kosmos as “world” or 
“universe” as its origins in philosophy, and is particularly well illustrated in the 
well-known quote of Heraclitus: 
 
κόσµον τόνδε οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν 
καὶ ἔσται πῦρ.5 
 
No one of gods or of men made this world, but it always was and is and will 
be fire. 
 
Most of these meanings of kosmos given above find expression also in the 
Septuagint and among the New Testament authors. For instance, in 1 Peter we 
read:  
 
Your adornment [κόσµος] should not be an external one: braiding the hair, 
wearing gold jewelry, or dressing in fine clothes, but rather the hidden 
character of the heart, expressed in the imperishable beauty of a gentle and 
calm disposition, which is precious in the sight of God.6 
 
By far the most common meaning of kosmos, however, among the New Testament 
authors is that which refers to the “world” in the sense of the English word, 
whether this world be the planet earth,7 humanity in general,8 the human 
experience,9 or the fallen world as the world as opposed to the divine existence.10  
 It is this latter most sense that the author of the Fourth Gospel likely 
intended the word kosmos to be understood at 8:23.11 When Jesus says, “You 
                                                
2 cf. Il. 10.472, εὖ κατὰ κόσµον, “in good order” i.e. “duly”; also Od. 8.179, οὐ κατὰ κόσµον, 
“shamefully”. 
3 cf. Pl. Rep. 2.373c, γυναικεῖος κόσµος, “women’s adornment”. 
4 cf. Arist. Pol. 1272 a 6. 
5 Heraclitus Fr. 30, trans. mine. 
6 1 Peter 3:3 − 3:4. 
7 cf. Mt. 4:8, ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσµῳ. 
8 cf. Jn. 8:12, ὁ σωτὴρ τοῦ κόσµου. 
9 1 Cor. 7:33, τὰ τοῦ κόσµου, “the affairs of the world”. 
10 cf. Jn. 12:31, ἄρχων τοῦ κόσµου i.e. the devil; 1 Cor. 1:20, σοφία τοῦ κόσµου vs. σοφία τοῦ 
θεοῦ; cf. also Eng. “worldliness”. 
11 Brown, Raymond. The Gospel and Epistles of John: A Concise Commentary (The Liturgical 
Press: Collegeville, 1986) 53.  
 belong to what is below, I belong to what is above. You are of this world, I am not 
of this world,”12 he is responding to “the Judaeans” who are questioning what he 
meant in a previous statement where he says, “but you will die in your sin. Where I 
am going, you cannot come.”13 Jesus is represented as an ambassador to the Father 
in much the same way as he was first introduced to Nicodemus.14 In fact this “from 
above” and “from below” dichotomy is sometimes one of the central interpretative 
keys to understanding the Fourth Gospel. 
 
Origen’s Exegesis of John 8:23 
 
Origen’s exegesis of John 8:23 is his fullest discussion of the idea of the kosmos in 
the Commentary on John (commJohn), but this is due to an accident of history. In 
his exegesis of John 1:29 (ἴδε ὁ ἀµνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ αἵρων τὴν ἁµαρτίαν τοῦ κόσµου) 
Origen asks the reader to consider “what we have said in earlier books about the 
meaning of the term ‘world’ in Scripture” so that he does not have to repeat it 
here.15 In order to frame the analysis of the special sense in which Origen calls the 
Prototokos a kosmos, it will be good to review briefly the exegesis of John 8:23 
that leads up to that cryptic sentiment. “And he said to them: You are from below, 
I am from above. You are of this world, I am not of this world.” 
 After quoting 8:23 Origen adduces a passage from earlier in the Gospel, “He 
who is of the earth is of the earth and speaks of the earth. He who comes from 
heaven is above all. What he has seen and heard, to this he bears testimony.”16 The 
most pressing question on his reader’s mind, Origen anticipates, will be whether 
“to be of the earth” and “to be from below” are the same. Origen thus sets out on a 
discussion of what it means to be “from below” and “from above,” and what it 
means to be “of this world” and “not of this world.” The contents of this discussion 
(commJohn 19.130 − 145) illustrate the various ways Origen thinks kosmos can be 
understood. There are in fact three different interpretations of the word kosmos in 
Origen’s exegesis of John 8:23, all of which mean “world” in some sense. The first 
is the kosmos that is the physical world, which includes both the heavens and the 
earth, that is, land and sky. The second is the kosmos that is the sinful world, as 
                                                
12 ὑµεῖς ἐκ τῶν κάτω ἐστέ, ἐγὼ ἐκ τῶν ἄνω εἰµί· ὑµεῖς ἐκ τούτου τοῦ κόσµου ἐστέ, ἐγὼ οὐκ εἰµὶ 
ἐκ τοῦ κόσµου τούτου. 
13 Jn. 8:21. 
14 cf. Jn. 3:13, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀναβέβηκεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν εἰ µὴ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς, ὁ υἱὸς 
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. 
15 commJohn 6.301. Heine (1993) agrees with Blanc (1970) that this discussion must be missing 
from the extant portions of the commentary. All translations are those of Heine (1993) unless 
otherwise indicated. 
16 Jn. 3:31 − 3:32. 
 opposed to the divine world. It is this sinful kosmos that the Savior frees us from. 
The third is the kosmos that is not able to be seen (κόσµος ἀόρατος) and that is 
“spiritual” (νοητός). This is not the first place in the commJohn that Origen has 
introduced this idea of a spiritual world. It comes up in book one of the 
commentary in a discussion of light and with particular reference to the sense in 
which Jesus calls himself the light of the world.17 There, Origen is grappling with 
the question of what it means that Christ has been given various titles to do with 
light—the light of men,18 the true light,19 the light of the gentiles.20 The light must 
be one of a metaphorical sense, since “the sun is the light of the world perceived by 
the senses” (αἰσθητὸς κόσµος).21 Origen thus supposes that “the Savior is the light 
of the spiritual world (νοητὸς κόσµος) because he shines on those who are rational 
and intellectual, that their mind may see its proper visions.”22 The terms under 
which one is able to behold this spiritual world are described in book one in ways 
similar to those of book nineteen—the spiritual world is an invisible world that is 
apprehended only by the pure of heart in the light of Christ. 
 Since the question of what Origen means by kosmos in the subsequent 
exegesis requires some unpacking of his text, it will be helpful first to offer the text 
itself in full along with the translation of Heine.  
 
Ζητήσεις δὲ εἰ κατὰ τι τῶν σηµαινοµένων δύναται ὁ Πρωτότοκος πάσης 
κτίσεως εἶναι κόσµος, καὶ µάλιστα καθ’ ὃ σοφία ἐστὶν ἡ πολυποίκιλος· τῷ 
γὰρ εἶναι πάντας οὑτινοσοῦν τοὺς λόγους, καθ’ οὓς γεγένηται πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ 
τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν σοφίᾳ πεποιηµένα, ὥς φησιν ὁ προφήτης· “Πάντα ἐν σοφίᾳ 
ἐποίησας,” ἐν αὐτῷ εἴη ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς κόσµος, τοσούτῳ ποικιλώτερος τοῦ 
αἰσθητοῦ κόσµου καὶ διαφέρων ὅσῳ διαφέρει γυµνὸς πάσης ὕλης τοῦ ὅλου 
κόσµου λόγος τοῦ ἐνύλου κόσµου, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῆς µετοχῆς 
τοῦ Λόγου, καὶ τῆς σοφίας, τῶν κοσµούντων τὴν ὕλην κεκοσµηµένων. 
 
But you will inquire if, in some sense, the first-born of all creation can be a 
world, and especially in so far as he is the manifold wisdom. For by being 
the principles of absolutely everything according to which all things made 
by God in wisdom have come to be - as the prophet says, “You made all 
things in wisdom” - in himself he would himself also be a “world” that 
surpasses the world of sense perception in its diversity and excels it as much 
                                                
17 commJohn 1.158; cf. Jn. 8:12. 
18 Jn. 1:4. 
19 Jn. 1:9. 
20 cf. Is. 49:6. 
21 commJohn 1.160. 
22 ibid. 1.61. 
 as the principle stripped of all the material of the whole world differs from 
the material world, a “world” constituted, not on the basis of matter, but on 
the participation of the things that have been set in order in the Word and 
Wisdom, which set matter in order.23 
 
 It is a difficult passage even in English and there are points at which I 
disagree with Heine’s translation, but I have included that translation here simply 
to illustrate the ambiguity of the translation of kosmos as “world”, which is the 
very problem this paper seeks to address. Other possible readings of this text will 
be discussed later, but for the time being let us simply look at the general structure 
of Origen’s argument. If we were to construct a bulleted list of Origen’s argument 
as to why or how the Prototokos is able to be a kosmos, it might look something 
like this: 
 
• Because he is “the manifold wisdom” (σοφία ἡ πολυποίκιλος) 
• By his being ‘the principles’ of creation (οἱ λόγοι) 
• And creation was fashioned by God in wisdom (ἐν σοφίᾳ) 
• Not because of his material nature (οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης) 
• But because he participates in Word and Wisdom (ἀπὸ τῆς µετοχῆς τοῦ 
Λόγου, καὶ τῆς σοφίας) 
• And these are what set matter in order (κοσµούντων τὴν ὕλην) 
 
 It is quite clear that here we are dealing with a sense of the word kosmos 
which Origen has not yet introduced in the preceding exegesis of John 8:23. 
Maurice Wiles assumes that Origen here is equating the spiritual world (νοητὸς 
κόσµος) with the Son of God.24 Wiles writes, “He does suggest that in one sense at 
least the νοητὸς κόσµος may be identified with the Son. This world is a κόσµος by 
virtue of the λόγος and the wisdom by which its basic material is ordered.” This is 
partly true, inasmuch as the Son as a kosmos has something to do with λόγος and 
σοφία, but here, at least, Origen is clearly not equating the Son with the spiritual 
world he has just described. The νοητὸς κόσµος is a kind of state of being, access 
to which is granted to persons who were originally from below but who have 
achieved a purity of heart through spiritual ascendency.  
 Origen, however, is asking a completely different question. How is the Son, 
as the firstborn of creation (i.e. the Prototokos), able to be a kosmos? Tzamalikos 
comes closer in asserting that, in this particular passage, Origen is using the term 
                                                
23 trans. Heine (1993). 
24 Wiles, Maurice F. The Spiritual Gospel: The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel in the Early 
Church. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1960) 77. 
 kosmos as a kind of metaphor, “in order to indicate the ‘multi-decorated’ wisdom 
of God.”25 But Origen ascribes kosmos to the Son not only on account of wisdom, 
but also in relation to οἱ λόγοι, the “principles” of creation, as well as by the Son’s 
participation in the Λόγος and Σοφία together, which “cosmify” the world, that is, 
set it in order (κοσµούντων). Thus – and this is essential – the Son as kosmos 
somehow involves the meaning of kosmos that echoes the verbal meaning 
involving “ordering” or “arranging”. It must also be kept in mind that Origen 





There is no scholarly consensus on the proper understanding of commJohn 19.147. 
This is largely due to difficulties inherent to the text. In 1954 Ralph Marcus of the 
University of Chicago published a short note in Harvard Theological Review 
discussing a disagreement of the then four modern editors of Origen’s text 
(Lommatzsch, Migne, Preuschen, and Brooke) about the punctuation (and 
therefore the meaning) of this passage.26 The main point of disagreement discussed 
in that note is the correct sense in which to read ἐν αὐτῷ after the Scriptural quote. 
Lommatzsch, Preuschen, and Brooke give a comma after the prepositional phrase, 
connecting it with the preceding infinitival phrase (τῷ γὰρ εἶναι). Migne places a 
comma after the quote, connecting ἐν αὐτῷ with what follows. There are also some 
minor issues with the text itself. For instance, in the Bodleian codex ὅλου is 
missing from τοῦ ὅλου κόσµου. Also for Migne’s accusative πάντας Marcus reads 
a genitive πάντος, connecting it with οὑτινοσοῦν instead of τοὺς λόγους. Marcus 
thinks Migne’s punctuation is the correct reading, but he also thinks that such a 
reading would leave the infinitival phrase lacking “an adverbial complement to 
εἶναι.”27 He therefore posits that either ἐν σοφίᾳ or ἐν αὐτῷ has been omitted after 
εἶναι.  
 Marcus senses an omission because of his reading of the syntactic function 
of the dative of the articular infinitive, which he understands as introducing a full 
subordinate clause dependent on a main clause whose verb is εἴη. As such, he 
understands the dative causally. In each of the three possible translations Marcus 
gives in his note, he renders the infinitival phrase as “Since the logoi of anything 
whatever […]”, the logical consequence of which he understands to be expressed 
                                                
25 Tzamalikos, P. Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time. (Brill: Boston, 2006) 117. 
26 Marcus, Ralph. “A Note on Origen” The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 47 No. 4 (Oct., 
1954), pp. 317 − 318. 
27 ibid. p. 317. 
 in the main clause ἐν αὐτῷ εἴη ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς κόσµος. For this reading to work, τοὺς 
λόγους must be taken as the grammatical subject of the infinitive εἶναι, in which 
event some kind of predicate adjective, a noun, or an adverbial phrase is lacking to 
answer what, where, how, etc. the logoi of each thing are. Marcus thus suggests an 
omission, that the logoi are either “in wisdom” or “in him” (i.e. the Prototokos). 
 If one takes the expressed ἐν αὐτῷ following the Scripture quote as the 
adverbial complement to εἶναι (as do Lommatzsch, Preuschen, and Brooke), then 
the following εἴη also lacks an adverbial complement. Thus Marcus suggests an 
omitted prepositional phrase within the infinitival phrase, and translates the 
passage in the following way: 
 
For since the logoi of anything whatever, in accordance with which all 
things created by God in wisdom came into being, as the prophet says, ‘All 
things hast thou made in wisdom’, are [in wisdom] (or [in the first-born / the 
Logos]), (then) there would also be in it (i.e. the Logos) the (intelligible) 
world which is as much more manifold than the sense perceptible world and 
different from it as the Logos of the whole world, which is bare of all matter, 
differs from the enmattered world, not because of its matter but because of 
its participation in the Logos and wisdom, which (both) order the matter of 
ordered things.28 
 
By “intelligible” world, Marcus seems to mean the invisible or spiritual world 
(κόσµος νόητος). This spiritual world then is understood to be within the Logos - 
but the antecedent of αὐτῷ, which Marcus reads as Logos, cannot be Logos but 
rather must be Prototokos. Origen’s question is not how the Logos is able to be a 
kosmos, but how the Prototokos is able to be a kosmos. Indeed, Marcus seems to 
regard the two titles as nearly synonymous. An additional inadequacy of the 
translation is the complete neglect of αὐτός, which he must understand as a 
modifier of κόσµος, yet omits in his translation.  
 Heine’s translation reflects a different reading of the text at a couple of 
points, the first of which is his rendering of the infinitival phrase, which he does 
not regard as fully subordinate to the main clause.  In other words, the grammatical 
subject of each clause, according to Heine’s reading, is the same — an unexpressed 
Πρωτότοκος. Unlike Marcus, Heine thus reads τοὺς λόγους not as the grammatical 
subject of εἶναι but as the predicate nominative qualifying an unexpressed 
Πρωτότοκος: 
 
                                                
28 ibid. p. 318, all punctuation and bracketing his. 
 For by being the principles of absolutely everything according to which all 
things made by God in wisdom have come to be (as the prophet says, ‘You 
made all things in wisdom’), in himself he would himself also be a ‘world’ 
that surpasses the world of sense perception in its diversity and excels it as 
much as the principle stripped of all the material of the whole world differs 
from the material world, a world constituted, not on the basis of matter, but 
on the participation of the things that have been set in order in the Word and 
Wisdom, which set matter in order. 
 
Removing the relative clause reveals the differences between the two renderings 
even more clearly: 
 
Marcus: For since the logoi of anything whatever are in wisdom (or in him), 
then there would also be in him the (intelligible) world …  
 
Heine: For by being the principles of absolutely everything, in himself he 
would himself be a ‘world’ …  
 
 A second point at which Heine differs from Marcus is his understanding of 
ἐν αὐτῷ and αὐτός, the latter of which Marcus does not even translate. Heine’s 
translation is questionable at this point; he reads ἐν αὐτῷ as a reflexive (“in 
himself”), which it cannot be, and he reads αὐτός as an intensive adjective 
modifying not κόσµος but again an unexpressed Πρωτότοκος. This reading puts 
quite a strain on the grammar. Neither of these renderings of αὐτῷ or αὐτός is a 
common or natural one. In order for αὐτός to act as the intensive, the modified 
noun must be expressed—otherwise it must be understood as the third person 
pronoun, “he” or “it” (as in ἐν αὐτῷ, “in him”). It would be very unusual indeed to 
see αὐτός as an intensive in the absence of a modified noun. Grammatically 
speaking, the regular way to understand αὐτός in this passage is in fact the one 
which both Marcus and Heine have neglected, and that is to take it as the intensive 
adjective modifying κόσµος, “the kosmos itself” or “kosmos itself.” 
 Here we must note also the third major point at which Marcus and Heine 
differ, and that is their reading of the verb εἴη. Marcus takes this as an example of 
the so-called “existential εἰµί” which is usually found at the beginning of a clause 
and, if in the present indicative, is accented (ἔστι, “there is”), i.e. is not enclitic. 
Here the verb is optative; thus Marcus translates, “there would also be…” Heine 
takes it as a regular copulative verb with an unexpressed subject modified by an 
unusual use of αὐτός as a bare intensive; “he would himself be …” From a 
grammatical point of view Marcus clearly has the stronger reading. The 
positioning of εἴη in front of αὐτὸς κόσµος certainly suggests its being understood 
 impersonally (i.e. “existential” εἰµί). Reading εἴη as a copulative verb in the 
manner of Heine requires a very strained use of αὐτός as an intensive modifying, 
not the noun that immediately follows it (κόσµος), but one that is unexpressed. It 
should also be noted that Heine, along with Marcus, follows Migne in placing a 
comma after the Scripture quotation in order to connect ἐν αὐτῷ with what follows. 
 With respect to the infinitival phrase, Heine’s reading must be preferred (i.e. 
“For by being the principles…”) in opposition to the suggestion of Marcus that an 
adverbial complement has been omitted. In the main clause, however, the reading 
of Marcus is to be preferred over that of Heine, for the reasons already given. 
Marcus however neglects to translate αὐτός, which should be taken as an intensive 
adjective modifying κόσµος, i.e. “the kosmos itself.”  
 In light of these considerations, my reading of commJohn 19.147 is the 
following: 
 
And you will ask in what sense the Firstborn of all creation is able to be a 
‘kosmos’, especially inasmuch as he is manifold wisdom. For by being the 
principles of absolutely everything according to which all things made by 
God in wisdom have come into being (as the prophet says, ‘You made all 
things in wisdom’), in him there would be kosmos itself, surpassing the 
perceptible kosmos and excelling it as much as a principle stripped of all the 
matter of the whole kosmos surpasses the material kosmos, not on account 
of its matter but on account of its participation in the Logos and in Wisdom 
which order the matter of ordered things. 
 
As noted in the previous section, it is not at all clear in what sense αὐτὸς κόσµος is 
to be understood in this passage. I have retained the Greek word kosmos in this 
translation in order to reflect this ambiguity; but I do think it is possible that Origen 
is using the word kosmos here in a rather specific way. If it is correct to take αὐτός 
with κόσµος, as I think it is, what would “kosmos itself” mean, other than the 
original etymological meaning of kosmos, that is, order? Origen’s reasoning is 
actually rather clear. The reason the Prototokos is kosmos itself is on account of its 
“participation in the Logos and in Wisdom, which order the matter of ordered 
things” (τῶν κοσµούντων τὴν ὕλην κεκοσµηµένων). What connects the Prototokos 
as kosmos to the Logos and to Wisdom is the the creative process of the ordering 
or arranging of matter. 
 Gerald Bostock has recently proposed that, “It is the fundamental notion of 
‘Cosmos’, meaning a reasoned and patterned Order, which is determinative for 
[Origen’s] philosophy of creation. This Order stands in contrast to the infinite 
variability of matter, and thus reflects the antithesis in Genesis I between the 
 polarities of chaos and ‘cosmos’.”29 A reading of the text of commJohn 19.147 
such as has been suggested in this paper would seem to support this claim. It is 
Order itself (Himself?) that takes the chaotic existence of matter and fashions it 
into the perceivable kosmos (ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσµος). This is made possible by Order’s 




In the opening chapters of the commJohn before offering exegesis on the text itself 
Origen makes a few comments on what he thinks the nature of the Gospel to be. 
He says, “If the good things [τὰ ἀγαθά] in the proclamation of those who preach 
the good news are investigated, the apostles preach Jesus.”30 Later he writes, “And 
let no one be surprised if we have understood Jesus to be announced by the plural 
‘good things.’ For when we have understood the things of which the names which 
the Son of God is called are predicated, we will understand how Jesus . . . is many 
good things.”31 The Gospel illustrates the many good things of Jesus which give 
rise to his many titles and names. Indeed, much of the first book of the commJohn 
is dedicated to explaining this multitude of names. Inasmuch as the Son of God is 
Wisdom, Origen tells us in book 19, he is also kosmos, that which orders the 
physical matter of creation. It would not be a cause for concern to Origen that this 
title is not given to the Son of God in Scripture, for he says, “But one who presents 
how Jesus is a multitude of good things can infer [καταστοχάζεσθαι] from these 
innumerable things written about him that the things which are in him in whom all 
the fullness of divinity ‘was pleased’ to dwell ‘bodily’ are by no means contained 
in writings.”32 This process of inference is precisely what leads Origen to call the 
Prototokos a kosmos. Notice this process is not properly eisegesis, which aims to 
confirm already held beliefs by “proof-texts”. Origen begins from the text and 
makes inferences which, to him, appear logical. One could certainly argue to the 
contrary, that Origen holds clear convictions about the nature of the kosmos and 
reads these convictions into the text; but what emerges from a sympathetic reading 
of Origen’s text, I think, is that Origen - who is as much a product of his education 
as anyone in history has been - yet moves from one sentiment to the next in a kind 
of path of discovery. In calling the Prototokos a kosmos, Origen is aware the 
statement is a difficult one to understand, yet he invites the reader (ζητήσεις) to 
                                                
29 Bostock, Gerald. “Origen’s Doctrine of Creation.” The Expository Times. Vol. 118 No. 5 
(2007) p. 223. 
30 commJohn 1.47. 
31 commJohn 1.52. 
32 commJohn 1.60. 
 consider what might (εἴη) prove to be one of those “mystical meanings stored up 
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